SonicWall Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) Vulnerability
A vulnerability in SonicWall’s cloud-based product registration system that was publicly reported by a media outlet was quickly researched, verified and promptly patched on August 26, 2020.
Approximately two weeks earlier, SonicWall identified the reported vulnerability (SNWLID-2020-0005) as part of its PSIRT program, and rapidly created a fix that underwent full testing and certification.
At no time did SonicWall detect, or become aware of, any attempted exploitation of the vulnerability in the cloud-based product registration system. The fix was successfully applied to the cloud system and no action is required by end-users.
SonicWall’s 24/7 security response team monitored for any activity related to the vulnerability while testing, certification and implementation of the patch was successfully completed.
At the time of the initial discovery, SonicWall reviewed previous connection data and determined that no account had been exploited due to the vulnerability and that there was extremely low risk of exploitation. A hacker or threat actor would require very specific account information and time to take advantage of the system. Any exploitation attempt would trigger an automated security alert to the legitimate account owner, as well as SonicWall’s security team, due to SonicWall’s layered security protocols.
The security and business needs of its customers are SonicWall’s top priorities. SonicWall continues to encourage the identification of vulnerabilities through its PSIRT and other programs, and continuously updates its solutions to protect against vulnerabilities in accordance with the level of the risk presented.
As part of SonicWall’s PSIRT program, an insecure direct object reference vulnerability (IDOR) was identified in the users/add-user API endpoint of SonicWall’s cloud-based product registration system
This could allow a normal authenticated user to manipulate API parameters and gain access to a user group or tenants of other user accounts, but only if the unauthorized user had the tenant ID of the legitimate account owner and if the account owner ignored and/or failed to act on the resulting security alert(s) that the attempt would generate.
The vulnerability patch was completed quickly and was subjected to a full QA cycle to understand and mitigate any potential end-user account management impact given the client-facing nature of the registration system.
SonicWall never became aware of and currently is not aware of any exploitation of the vulnerability nor does SonicWall have any reason to believe that the vulnerability has been exploited.